Christians in early and classical Sunnī law David M. Freidenreich Islamic law devotes considerable attention to regulations related to Christians, who comprised a significant minority population within the medieval Islamic Near East. Such regulations appear in numerous areas of law, and every compendium or treatise that addresses one or more of these areas is likely to address Christians. Comprehensive documentation of references to Christians in Islamic legal literature, of the sort attempted in the preceding essay on Muslims in canon law, is therefore practically impossible. Such an endeavor is also of questionable utility because different law books often cover the same ground in very similar ways. The present essay seeks instead to sketch Sunnī laws relating to Christians in broad strokes and to direct readers to relevant secondary scholarship for further details and for citations of the most important primary sources. Shīʿī laws regarding Christians differ in significant ways from their Sunnī counterparts and therefore merit separate treatment. 1 The place of Christians and other non-Muslims in Islamic (primarily Sunnī) law has received considerable attention within academic scholarship. Antoine Fattal's Le statut légal des non-Musulmans en pays d'Islam, a general survey, retains its value as an entry point into the study of this subject. It has been supplemented and often surpassed by a variety of more focused studies, of which Yohanan Friedmann's Tolerance and coercion in Islam deserves particular mention. A number of works, including Fattal's and especially Mark R. Cohen's Under crescent and cross, devote considerable attention to comparing medieval Islamic laws governing non-Muslims with their counterparts in Roman, Sasanid, and Christian sources. Placed in this context rather than viewed against the backdrop of twenty-first-century Western norms, the laws expressed in medieval Islamic sources appear commonplace and even relatively benign; non-Muslims subject to these laws, of course, surely did not see them as such. The literature on minorities in Islamic law, although strong in many other respects, generally neglects to consider change over time in regulations regarding non-Muslims. This tendency, which the present essay makes no attempt to rectify, is due in part to the significant challenges associated with efforts to date legal works and normative statements ascribed to what scholars call the 'early' or formative period of Islamic law, roughly the first three Islamic centuries.
The onset of the 'classical' period of Sunnī law, which extends beyond the year 1500, occurs in the tenth Christian century with the crystallization of four schools of Sunnī legal thought named after and oriented toward the teachings of eighth-or ninth-century 'founders' . The differences between these schools with respect to numerous aspects of jurisprudential theory and legal substance result in sometimes significant differences in their respective laws regarding Christians, differences that medieval and modern scholars alike duly note and discuss. In most cases, the authors of legal compendia and treatises were private citizens rather than government functionaries. These works, therefore, express normative ideals that did not necessarily receive support from the coercive powers of the state. Indeed, as an essay in a later volume discusses, Muslim political authorities at times treated their Christian subjects in ways that contravened the norms articulated in classical legal sources, sometimes to the benefit of these subjects and sometimes to their detriment. The present essay highlights the manner in which Sunnī authorities classify Christians.
3 Most laws treat Christians as non-Muslims, no different from Jews, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and other 'dhimmīs' , the term for religious minorities to which we will return. Some treat Christians as 'Scripturists' ('People of the Book'), adherents of a religion based on a divinely revealed scripture; as such, Christians are classified alongside Jews and Muslims. 4 This distribution pattern encapsulates the place of Christians within the worldview of Sunnī jurists: Christians are inferior to Muslims yet they, along with Jews, merit a limited degree of parity with Muslims. Hardly any laws treat Christians in a class alone, and those that do make clear that the authors of early and classical Sunnī legal literature generally perceive Christianity as posing nothing more than a theoretical challenge for Muslims. In the wake of European Christian military conquests, especially in the Iberian peninsula, some Muslim authorities developed a more defensive posture regarding Christians than is manifest in classical texts; an essay in a later volume addresses this development.
Christians as dhimmīs
A sizeable majority of Islamic law regarding Christians treats the latter as dhimmīs -more formally, ahl al-dhimma, 'people subject to a guarantee of protection' . This term applies solely to non-Muslims living in lands governed by Muslims who accept the authority of their Muslim overlords; it thus excludes both rebellious non-Muslims and non-Muslims who live outside the Islamic world, including those who reside temporarily in Muslim lands for trade or other purposes.
5 Some 3 On the classification of non-Muslims, see also Y. Friedmann, 'Classification of unbelievers in Sunnī Muslim law and tradition ' , JSAI 22 (1998) Spain. Vol. 3, Arabic sources (711-1501) , Warminster, 1992, pp. 112-15. 9 Q 9:29. The original meaning of this verse has been subject to considerable scholarly debate, whose major players include M.M. Bravmann, C. Cahen, M.J. Kister, which accounts for different details in the laws governing its payment. On the one hand, this tax constitutes a fee for services rendered to dhimmīs by Muslims: the right to live as non-Muslims in Islamic territories, exemption from military service, and the protection provided by Muslim soldiers. For this reason, jurists generally exempt women, minors, slaves, and the infirm from the jizya payment, as Muslims in these categories are exempt from military service. (Authorities differ over whether and to what degree the tax applies to indigent dhimmīs.) 10 On the other hand, the jizya constitutes a penalty imposed upon nonMuslims on account of their refusal to embrace Islam. This notion underlies the widespread norm of exacting payment of the jizya in humiliating circumstances.
11 Dhimmīs are also required to pay distinctive property taxes and to pay taxes on commercial transactions at a higher rate than Muslims. through a variety of laws. Many of these appear in the so-called 'Pact of ʿUmar' , which purports to be a set of surrender terms proposed by Christians to the second Caliph, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭ ṭ āb (r. 634-44); jurists ultimately applied the terms in this pact to all dhimmīs, overriding local capitulation agreements. Scholars dismiss the association of this pact with ʿUmar but find in its contents and form elements that reflect eighth-and ninth-century historical realities, including extant capitulation treaties and common caliphal administrative practices. 13 Among the terms of the Pact of ʿUmar, Christians obligate themselves to show deference to Muslims by rising when Muslims wish to sit and refraining from building homes higher than those of Muslims. Christians must provide hospitality to traveling Muslims, may not shelter foreign spies, and may not strike Muslims, nor may they purchase slaves whose service ought to benefit Muslims.
14 Christians further agree not to ride horses or to bear arms, both symbols of elevated social status, and commit themselves to wear their traditional clothing and not to adopt Muslim styles of dress, honorific titles, or Arabic signets; these practices, which may have originally been meant to preserve the distinction between Muslims and the majority population, ultimately became signs of humiliation as well. Budapest, 1949, 74-85 (repr. in The medieval Near East. Social and economic history, London, 1978) . Restrictions governing the clothing and riding practices of non-Muslims appear consistently in medieval accounts of an edict promulgated by the Caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, with whom some scholars associate the Pact of ʿUmar itself; see Levy-Rubin, 'From early harbingers' , and Levy-Rubin's forthcoming book. On the question of why Christians would commit themselves to Various legal sources also prohibit Muslims themselves from adopting the mannerisms of non-Muslims, especially in matters of dress and ritual, and instruct Muslims to refrain from greeting non-Muslims in the same manner that they greet fellow believers. 16 Jurists from Andalusia express particular concern about the differentiation of Muslims and Christians. 17 This elevated concern is often manifest in differences of opinion between members of the Mālikī school of jurisprudence, dominant in Andalusia and North Africa, and jurists affiliated with other Sunnī schools.
Laws regarding dhimmīs exemplify the dictum, 'Islam is superior and cannot be superceded' .
18 For this reason, Islamic law prohibits dhimmīs from serving in positions of authority over Muslims, whether as public officials, members of the military, or owners of Muslim slaves; the law also restricts commercial interactions in which a Muslim might become inferior to a dhimmī.
19 According to one authority, 19 The prohibition against dhimmīs in public office, rooted in numerous qurʾānic verses and ḥ adīths, was often ignored by rulers in the interest of expediency. Jurists differ over the legitimacy of employing dhimmīs in the military. See Friedmann, Muslims ought not to perform menial labor on behalf of dhimmīs or allow themselves to be treated by non-Muslim physicians. 20 The principle that Muslims should not be subject to the authority of non-Muslims underlies a number of inequities in the administration of justice in Islamic law. Legal proceedings involving a Muslim and a dhimmī must be held in an Islamic court, although dhimmīs are entitled to turn to their own judicial authorities for internal matters.
21
When the accused is a Muslim, dhimmīs are not allowed to offer testimony against him; some jurists reject the legitimacy of testimony by dhimmīs in all circumstances on the grounds that non-Muslims are presumed to be untrustworthy as witnesses.
22 Some jurists value the worth of Muslims and non-Muslims differently for the purpose of assessing penalties in cases of murder or bodily injury; others assert that payment of the jizya entitles dhimmīs to equal treatment under the law in this respect. 23 Islamic law denies dhimmīs the right to inherit from relatives who converted to Islam; authorities differ over whether Muslims are entitled to inherit from non-Muslim relatives and whether dhimmīs of different confessions may inherit one from another.
24
Islamic law seeks to create a society that makes manifest the supremacy of Islam, and to this end it curtails the public display of nonMuslim religious life even as it allows non-Muslims to practice their own religions. Several of the terms of the Pact of ʿUmar relate specifically to religious matters. Chief among these is the rule that Christians may not build new churches, monasteries, or other religious buildings, and that they may not restore any such buildings that fall into Leiden, 2000, 269-78, p. 274 . Some authorities, however, prohibit all dhimmīs from possessing or consuming wine; see Levy-Rubin, 'From early harbingers' . 28 See Safran, 'Identity and differentiation' , pp. 588-97; A. Turki, 'Situation du "tributaire" qui insulte l'islam, au regard de la doctrine et de la jurisprudence musulmanes ' , Studia Islamica 30 (1969) Fattal, Statut légal, 29 Concern about participation in Christian festivals is especially prevalent in Andalusian and North African sources. See Safran, 'Identity and differentiation ' , p. 581; status, converts to Christianity from Islam are ineligible for this status and are therefore liable to the death penalty if they refuse to re-embrace Islam. Some authorities similarly forbid conversion from one nonMuslim religion to another on the grounds that one may not choose any religion over Islam. Forced conversion of non-Muslims is generally forbidden, and some jurists therefore allow non-Muslims who converted out of duress to return to their original religion. Jurists do, however, condone the compulsory conversion of non-Muslim women, minors, and prisoners of war in various circumstances. 30 Islamic law defines the offspring of marriages between Muslim men and Christian women as Muslims. Some jurists infer from this that the offspring of mixed marriages among dhimmīs are to be affiliated to the religion of their father, but most affiliate such children to the superior of the parents' faiths; in the latter case, the child of a Zoroastrian father and Christian mother is a Christian.
31
Non-Muslims may not reside in the region of Mecca and Medina, in accordance with the last will of the Prophet; jurists differ over whether this prohibition extends to the entirety of the Arabian peninsula, and whether it applies to visitors. Many jurists specifically prohibit non-Muslims from entering the precincts of the Kaʿba in Mecca, and some extend this prohibition to all mosques. 32 Proceeds from zakāt, the alms tax obligatory upon Muslims, may not be given to non-Muslims who would otherwise qualify for such aid, although Muslims are welcome to give other forms of charity to non-Muslims.
33
Various authorities prohibit non-Muslims from possessing or studying the Qurʾān or other sacred Islamic texts, a prohibition sometimes associated with the assertion that non-Muslims are impure. Gainesville FL, 1995, 180-92, pp. 185-86 Islamic legal literature tends to regard non-Muslims as impure, but jurists vigorously debate the reason for this status and its implications for Muslim-dhimmī interactions. Sunnīs generally hold that nonMuslims are impure by virtue of their failure to perform the purification rituals necessary to restore the state of purity that is disrupted by any number of normal events. These jurists also speak of the beliefs of non-Muslims as 'impure' in a metaphorical sense. Some Sunnīs, however, hold that non-Muslims are intrinsically, and not merely circumstantially, impure on account of their beliefs. This minority opinion is especially prominent among jurists from Andalusia and North Africa, who tend to refer specifically to the impurity of Christians; scholars have suggested that social factors distinctive to the region may underlie this position. Even these jurists, however, do not regard the impurity of non-Muslims as grounds for stringent measures separating Muslims from non-Muslims of the sort that ultimately developed in some Shīʿī circles; Muslims who come into contact with non-Muslims in a state of impurity are simply enjoined to perform the necessary act of ablution before engaging in ritual activity. 35 Consequently, the notion that non-Muslims are impure does not interfere with Sunnī laws that permit certain forms of intimacy between Muslims and People of the Book, permissions associated with the fact that Christians and Jews adhere to divinely revealed Scriptures.
Christians as Scripturists
Islamic laws that treat Christians as dhimmīs tend to impose rules and restrictions on the activity of non-Muslims. Laws that treat Christians as Scripturists, in contrast, are primarily reflexive in nature: they regulate what Muslims themselves may or may not do in matters that relate to non-Muslims. Laws that fall into this latter category may still profitably be labeled 'dhimmī law' -analogous to Christian 'Jewry law' and 'Saracen law' -as they presume the inferiority and subservience of the Christians (and Jews).
36 These laws, however, emphasize the relatively elevated status of Christians and Jews among non-Muslims. Whereas the laws surveyed in the previous section express a binary distinction between Us and Them (1 and 0), laws that treat Christians as Scripturists reveal that Muslim jurists embraced a more complex system for classifying foreigners, one in which Christians and Jews are, in mathematical terms, less than 1 but greater than 0.
This intermediate status is given numerical expression by some jurists in their discussion of the blood-money that is due in certain cases to the surviving relatives of a murder victim. According to jurists of the Mālikī and Ḥ anbalī schools, the amount of the bloodmoney when the victim is a Christian or Jew is either 4,000 or 6,000 dirhams, whereas when the victim is a Zoroastrian or another type of non-Muslim the payment due is only 800 dirhams. (The blood-money for a Muslim victim is 12,000 dirhams.) Other jurists hold that the value of the blood-money is identical, regardless of the affiliation of the victim; one jurist, Ibn Ḥ azm, holds on technical grounds that no blood-money is paid when the victim is a non-Muslim.
37
Most legal discussion of Christians as Scripturists stems from the qurʾānic verse:
Permitted to you this day are the good things, and the food of those who were given the Book is permitted to you, and your food is permitted to them. So are the chaste women among the believers and the chaste women among those who were given the Book before you, provided you give them their dowries and take them in chastity, not in wantonness or as mistresses. If anyone denies the faith, his work shall be of no avail to him, and in the Hereafter he will be among the losers. (Q 5:5) Sunnī interpreters and jurists uniformly understand the term 'food' (ṭ aʿām) in this verse as referring to all foodstuffs that God has not prohibited, including permissible meat, the subject of the preceding 36 On the terms 'imposed law' , 'reflexive law' , 'Jewry law' , and 'Saracen law' , see the companion essay on canon law in this volume, which observes that Christian Saracen law from ca. 650 to 1000, unlike Jewry law from the period, was exclusively reflexive in its nature. 37 Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 47-50. verses. Animal slaughter was regarded as a divinely prescribed ritual activity in Near Eastern antiquity. For this reason, the declaration that the slaughter practices of 'the believers' and the slaughter practices of 'those who were given the Book' are equally valid indicates that Christians and Jews, no less than Muslims themselves, act in accordance with authentic divine revelations. 38 The meat of animals slaughtered by Zoroastrians, in contrast, is forbidden for consumption by Muslims. The permission of meat prepared by Scripturists expresses the affinity -indeed, the parity -of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. 39 The limits to this parity, however, become apparent as Q 5:5 continues. 'Chaste women among those who were given the Book before you' are no less suitable for marriage than 'chaste women among the believers' because all come from communities committed to an authentic Scripture; idolatrous women, in contrast, are unfit marriage partners (Q 2:221). Nevertheless, a Muslim woman may not marry a Christian or Jewish man because a Muslim wife may not be subservient to a non-Muslim husband. 40 Sunnī jurists, who regard such a union as a serious breach of the proper social order, prescribe severe punishments for dhimmīs who transgress this norm, and they require married women who convert to Islam to separate from their non-Muslim husbands if the husbands do not follow suit.
41 Q 5:5 and the legal discussions that develop around it strike a careful balance between the legitimation of Christianity and Judaism on the one hand and the affirmation of Islam's superiority on the other. The former principle, no less than the latter, is crucial to the self-definition of Islam that emerges from these texts: Islam stands in continuity with its predecessor religions even as it constitutes the culmination and climax of God's unfolding revelation. The theological and definitional issues at stake in the permission of Christian meat and Christian wives become clear in legal discussions of borderline Christian communities. Some jurists limit the application of these permissions to dhimmīs: only Christians who acknowledge the superiority of Islam may be granted a limited degree of parity with Muslims. 42 The Banū Taghlib, a large and powerful Arab Christian tribe at the time of the Arab conquest, attracts particular attention in the legal literature and becomes paradigmatic of Arab Christians in general. 43 Most Sunnī authorities treat the Banū Taghlib as Christians even if they might be ignorant of their religion's tenets or latecomers to the faith. Some, however, express antipathy toward the Taghlibīs and refuse to extend to them the permissive laws that apply to other Christians, apparently out of a sense that all Arabs ought to embrace the teachings of God's Messenger to the Arabs. Others limit these permissive laws to Christians whose ancestors converted to Christianity before the time of Muḥ ammad. Pre-Islamic converts, after all, associated themselves with the best form of religion then in existence, but those who converted to Christianity after the time of Muḥ ammad rejected their obligation to believe not only in acknowledging their permissibility, see also Safran, 'Identity and differentiation ' , pp. 583-84 . 42 God but also in his final Prophet. The Shāfiʿī jurist Yaḥ yā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 1277) draws a further distinction between those whose ancestors embraced Christianity before that religion was corrupted and those whose ancestors converted between the time of its corruption and the revelation of the Qurʾān. As Muslim jurists themselves did not know when Christianity became corrupted, this distinction is of no practical value and reflects the scholastic nature of much of the discussion regarding laws that treat Christians as Scripturists. These laws serve first and foremost to express Sunnī ideas regarding the relationship between Islam and its predecessor religions. 44 The focus of Islamic legal discourse regarding Christians on issues of theoretical rather than practical relevance is also apparent in the only legal discussion known to this author that treats Christians not as dhimmīs or Scripturists but rather as believers in the divinity of Christ. 45 Islamic law requires Muslim butchers to invoke the name of God over the act of animal slaughter, and Muslim jurists presume that idolatrous butchers invoke the name of a being other than God. These jurists also discuss the status of meat prepared by a Christian butcher who invokes the name of Christ. As no Christian source indicates that Christian butchers actually engaged in this practice, it would seem that these discussions are scholastic in their orientation, designed to probe the degree to which Islam's legitimation of Christianity excuses Christians from the basic principles of Islamic monotheism. 46 The debate regarding meat from animals slaughtered in the name of Christ is surprisingly vigorous, with prominent Sunnī authorities lining up on both sides of the argument. Most jurists express serious reservations about the permissibility of such meat, but even those who prohibit its consumption are careful to preserve the permissibility in principle of meat prepared by Christians. The symbolic significance of this permission, embodying as it does the affinity between Islam and its predecessor traditions, is evidently of considerable
